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Global imbalances and developing countries
The main distinguishing features of present-day global imbalances go beyond their sheer amount and 
generalisation. First, the world economy is characterised by an increased and dynamic presence of 
many developing countries that simultaneously have turned from deﬁ  cit into surplus economies. Second, 
imbalances happen in a context of variable exchange rates and under an accelerated process of ﬁ  nancial 
globalisation. Third, the international reserve currency is basically the currency of just one advanced 
country in the world. 
Both the variability of exchange rates –in principle freeing countries of the need to defend their parities– 
and the easy availability of private foreign ﬁ  nance –liberating them from the limits imposed either by the 
amount of foreign exchange reserves or the conditional access to IMF resources– go to a great extent 
to explain the increase and generalisation of current account deﬁ  cits. But, additionally, the capacity of 
the United States to run deﬁ  cits ﬁ  nanced by the fact of their issuing the international reserve currency, 
has decisively contributed to the explosion in the magnitude of the imbalances. Of course, the ability to 
ﬁ  nance deﬁ  cits by resorting to foreign inﬂ  ows is dominated by its variability and by the accumulation of 
debt frequently ending up in severe crises. Thus, ﬁ  nancial stability is endangered. 
On the surpluses side, quite a few major advanced countries persist in generating them instead of promoting 
fast rates of growth and improving the lot of their own citizens. Thus, the old-time deﬂ  ationary bias that 
places limits on deﬁ  cit countries while leaving the major surplus countries to unfettered run restrictive 
policies playing beggar-thy-neighbour on the rest of the world still rules the present-day non-system. 
Surely, many fast growing developing countries, having on the contrary become the dynamic force in 
the world economy, play a completely different role based on their having overcome the restrictions that 
deﬁ  cits used to place on their performance.
Redressing global imbalances to avoid ﬁ  nancial instability, therefore, would, at the international level, 
require regulating “speculative” private international capital ﬂ  ows, on the one hand, and devising a new 
international monetary system that would run on the basis of a multilateral reserve currency. Additionally, 
a less restrictive mechanism than the conditionality-run IMF should be established for clearing temporary 
imbalances with similar obligations for surplus and deﬁ  cit countries, although growth rates and the stage 
of development would have to be taken into account. 
Redressing global imbalances, however, should not be made at the expense of growth in the world economy 
that as mentioned before has come to increasingly depend on the developing countries’ economies. 
Room, therefore, would have to be built for the surpluses of the developing countries following successful 
export-led strategies to be accommodated within such a system. This way, developing countries will keep 
being able to pursue expansionary policies, reduce inequality and continue to represent a dynamic force 
in global terms. 
MERCEDES MARCÓ DEL PONT
Governor
Banco Central de la República Argentina
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I
n the last months, global imbalances have been 
back under the limelight. With a recovery even 
mild and fragile, some of the largest imbalances 
that had decreased under the impact of the slowdown 
in economic activity, have resumed climbing. 
For instance, with some ups and downs, the US balance 
of trade deﬁ  cit has been increasing since April 2009. 
In turn, a few other major countries have been 
expanding their surpluses. Most recently, Germany 
and Japan have seen their trade balances growing, 
while that of China –after a strong upswing in the 
years 2003-2008– has been gradually decreasing as 
depicted, with monthly frequency, in the following 
graph. In addition, the IMF estimates that the United 
States current account deﬁ  cit will be increasing from 
USD 378 billion, last year, to USD 466.5 billion in 2010, 
while the combined surplus of Germany and Japan 
will increase this year to USD 366.5 billion from 
USD 305 billion last year (China’s current account 
surplus is estimated to reach USD 270 billion, less than 
the sum of those two major advanced countries and 
4.7% of its GDP not far away from the 4% standard 
being suggested by the US Secretary of Treasury at 
Seoul in November this year).1
The renewed rise in global imbalances is a cause for 
concern as the experience of the last forty years has 
shown that their sustainability after a point is far from 
assured and that they give way to current account 
reversals accompanied by crises characterised by 
major changes in exchange rates and in capital ﬂ  ows.2
Some of the features of the last few years in the 
accumulation of current account mismatches, 
however, set it apart from the previous experiences.
1| MAGNITUDE AND GENERALISATION 
OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES
The magnitude of global imbalances both in absolute 
terms and relative to world GDP is much larger than 
in the previous three decades as may be gathered 
from the following graphs. 
A second trait of global imbalances is their 
generalisation to an increasing number of countries. 
Measures of their dispersion do conﬁ  rm that it 
is on the rise (the dispersion grows over time 
1  See IMF, WEO, Database, by country, October 2010. China’s trade surplus increased in October but it is difﬁ  cult to predict if it’s a seasonal movement or if it 
reveals a switch in its downward trend. 
2  At the beginning of the 1970s, accumulation of current account imbalances led to the demise of the Bretton Woods system plus the temporary introduction of trade 
protectionist measures by the United States. Again, the 1980s showed a renewed accumulation of current account mismatches with a serious overvaluation of the 
US dollar, to some extent managed through international agreements but anyway leading to serious disruptions. And of course, the 1990s were characterized by serious 
imbalances, most speciﬁ  cally involving some developing countries ending up in drastic negative shifts of many points of their GDP in capital ﬂ  ows and overall crises.
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even if the United States and China are excluded), 
accompanied also with asymmetries and “fat tails”, 
i.e., there are some extreme cases. Dispersion is found 
to be closely associated with ﬁ  nancial globalisation.3 
Persistence is also an attribute of imbalances; but 
even correcting for a trend in this direction, the case 
of the US deﬁ  cit stands on its own as it is much larger 
than what that trend would explain.4 
But as it will be shown later, in the agregate, developing 
countries have in this ﬁ  rst decade of the XXIst century 
managed to become surplus countries when they used 
to be deﬁ  cit ones; a true break in the above mentioned 
persistence of current account signs. 
2| FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION AND THE 
PREDOMINANCE OF THE US DOLLAR 
AS A RESERVE CURRENCY 
2|1  The process of ﬁ  nancial globalisation 
and developing countries
Of course, as just mentioned, the increase in 
magnitude, but more speciﬁ  cally the generalisation 
of current account imbalances, is associated with an 
equivalent process in relation with ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows 
as well as to the speciﬁ  c case of the United States 
being able to ﬁ  nance its deﬁ  cits by the issuance of 
the predominant “reserve currency”. In the last two 
decades the process of “ﬁ  nancialisation” –or ﬁ  nancial 
deepening– and of its internationalisation has built up 
room to resort to private ﬁ  nance, liberating countries 
of the limits placed by their foreign exchange reserves 
or borrowing under “conditionality” from the IMF to 
manage their balance of payments deﬁ  cits. 
As to “ﬁ  nancialisation” just in the United States, 
beginning in 1980 and up to 2007, ﬁ  nancial assets as 
a proportion of GDP had gone up from 192 to 442 per 
cent.5 Worldwide, between 1990 and 2007, ﬁ  nancial 
assets went from a ﬁ  gure close to that of world GDP 
in the initial year to more than 3.5 times world GDP 
in the last one (from USD 55 billion to 196 billion).6 
Moreover while in the year 2000 only 11 countries had 
ﬁ  nancial assets above 3.5 times their own GDP, by 2007 
this “ﬁ  nancial depth” had reached 25 countries, some 
developing countries among them. In this last year, 
50 per cent of the increase in ﬁ  nancial assets was 
located in the developing countries.7 
Up to 2007, internationalisation of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows was 
even faster than the process of ﬁ  nancial deepening. 
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3  See Faruquee, Hamid and Jaewoo Lee (2009): “Global dispersion of current accounts: is the universe expanding?”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 56, No. 3. 
See, also, Baclet and Vidon (2008): “The world distribution of external imbalances: revisiting the stylised facts”, Banque de France, Occasional Paper, No. 6, June. 
4 See  Faruquee,  op.cit., Figure 5, p. 548 and Baclet, op.cit., Chart 4 D, p. 6, this last one shows a spike in “kurtosis” in the early 2000s that almost disappears 
when the US is excluded. 
5  See McKinsey Global Institute: “Global capital markets: entering a new era” (September 2009), Exhibit 1 and IMF “Global ﬁ  nancial stability report” (April 2009), 
Table 3 where it might be veriﬁ  ed that for emerging market countries as a whole, the relation between ﬁ  nancial assets and GDP was 272% but for Asia it was 389%. 
6  See McKinsey Global Institute: “Mapping global capital markets: Fifth annual report” (October 2008) and “Fourth annual report” (January 2008).
7  See McKinsey Global Institute, (October 2008), op.cit., Exhibit 7.
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Beginning in 1990 international capital movements 
were growing at 15 per cent per year reaching a 
volume 8.3 times that of the initial year (while 
international trade only increased 3.4 times in that 
same period). Their proportion, in 2007, relative to 
that of world GDP was around 20 per cent (some 
USD 11 trillion).8 Admittedly, the largest part of 
these international ﬁ  nancial movements involved 
the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
euro area. But ﬂ  ows involving developing countries 
were growing at twice the rate of those involving 
only the advanced ones. 
The following graphs show the accelerated expansion 
of net capital inﬂ  ows to developing countries and 
most speciﬁ  cally of private capital ﬂ  ows as net 
ofﬁ  cial ﬂ  ows –bilateral and multilateral– not only 
lost importance but in several years actually became 
negative. The process was facilitated by the measures 
of ﬁ  nancial account liberalisation undertaken by the 
developing countries. But as more than one study has 
argued the “push” factors in major ﬁ  nancial centres 
are much more important than the “pull” factor of 
policies in the receiving country.9 
2|2  The instability of capital ﬂ  ows 
and the “boom-bust” cycles 
in developing countries
But what also stands out under examination of the 
performance of capital ﬂ  ows to developing countries 
is their instability. Particularly unstable are ofﬁ  cial 
ﬂ  ows, on the one hand, and private ﬂ  ows other than 
foreign direct investment. The sheer fact that capital 
ﬂ  ows show such a degree of instability underlines the 
fact that they are not driven by policy errors in the 
receiving countries as many observers would like us 
to believe. If such would be the case differences in 
cyclical position and policy mistakes in the different 
countries would cancel each other out. Therefore, 
“push” factors are driving net capital ﬂ  ows from 
developed to developing countries to a great extent 
connected to ﬁ  nancial conditions in the mature 
economies. 
In fact, to a certain degree capital ﬂ  ows tend to be 
countercyclical vis-a-vis the performance of the 
source economies. On the downside of the cycle 
with interest rates at low levels both due to a 
dearth of opportunities for investment but also as a 
consequence of the attempt by monetary authorities 
to stimulate activity, low interest rates “push” 
investors to search for more proﬁ  table placements, 
the nowadays so-called “carry-trade”, like under 
quantitative easing 2 (QE2) in the United States 
right now. The contrary happens at the top of the 
cycle.10 Additionally, capital ﬂ  ows have shown to be 
pro-cyclical, i.e., rather than smoothing income and 
consumption in the receiving country, they do the 
contrary.11 
8  See McKinsey Global Institute (October 2008), op.cit., Exhibit 4 and (January 2008), op.cit, Exhibit 3.2.
9  For a contribution summarising and reformulating other studies on “push” vis-a-vis “pull” factors in the determination of capital ﬂ  ows to developing countries, see 
Ferrucci, Herzberg, Soussa and Taylor: “Understanding capital ﬂ  ows to emerging market economies”, in Bank of England Financial Stability Review, June 2004. 
Their conclusion was: “The main lesson to be drawn is that banking ﬂ  ows and bond spreads are both signiﬁ  cantly inﬂ  uenced by push factors, although banking 
ﬂ  ows relatively less so, possibly due to the nature of the bank-borrower relationship. This implies a need for caution by developing countries in borrowing too 
heavily during times of a benign external ﬁ  nancing environment, as a reversal in credit conditions is more often than not beyond the control of the borrower”. 
“…it is important to bear in mind that what is a sustainable level of leverage during good times is potentially unsustainable over a longer horizon, regardless of 
the creditworthiness of the borrower”.
10  See, for instance, Suter, op.cit. or Pettis: “The volatility machine”; OUP (2001), especially Chap. 4 “180 years of liquidity expansion and international lending”. 
The ﬁ  rst Secretary General of UNCTAD, Raúl Prebisch, had already detected such a pattern in the 1920s in the case of an Emerging Market of that era, i.e., 
Argentina. In various issues of the “Economic Review” of the Banco de la Nación Argentina in the years 1928 to 1929, Prebisch describes, for instance, how the 
“boom” in Wall Street and the tight monetary policy introduced by the Federal Reserve to cope with that era of “irrational exuberance” had driven funds away 
from the Argentine market that had entered in a previous period of easier money conditions in the United States. Moreover, Prebisch argued that the volatility of 
capital ﬂ  ows was one of the two main driving forces behind the “Argentine economic cycle”, the other one being the behaviour of exports.
11  See, for instance, Lane: “Do international investment income ﬂ  ows smooth income?” Trinity College Dublin and CEPR (May 2001). 
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The above behaviour leads to a well established 
boom-and-bust cycle in developing countries 
dominated by “push” factors associated with the 
instability of capital inflows responding to the 
domestic cycles of the major advanced economies. 
Responding to such a “push” cycle another one 
gets established in the developing country that 
acquires some independence vis-a-vis the ﬁ  rst one. 
During the ﬁ  rst phase, driven mainly by events in 
international markets –although also inﬂ  uenced by 
a shift to “market-friendly” policies in the developing 
countries– private capital starts ﬂ  owing to these far-
away lands. Those inﬂ  ows simultaneously add to 
demand and provide the wherewithal –in terms of 
foreign currency– to start an economic expansion. 
In an environment of growth, government revenues 
increase and price stability is achieved with more 
ease, most speciﬁ  cally as the easy availability of 
foreign ﬁ  nance tends to depress –viewed from the 
“pesos” per foreign currency ratio– the exchange 
rate, a crucial element of price pressures in those 
economies. A virtuous cycle looks like having been 
instituted. 
Fragilities, however, accumulate through trade 
deﬁ  cits, foreign indebtedness and an exchange rate 
that puts the tradable goods sectors at a disadvantage. 
A sudden “rationing” of capital ﬂ  ows and/or the 
increase in “country risk” spreads, results in less 
growth and declining government revenues. Higher 
interest rates and lower growth rates determine 
a reduced debt sustainability requiring –at high 
levels of indebtedness– larger and larger primary 
and/or trade surpluses, to avoid an explosive 
increase in, respectively, public or external debt ratios 
to GDP. Reduced debt sustainability calculations lead 
to further rationing and higher interest rates. The 
country is forced to undergo a drastic macroeconomic 
adjustment. The crisis has set in. Notice that even if 
the beginning of such a cycle got support from the 
“push” cycle originated in the advanced economies, 
the crisis in this case does not necessarily require 
an increase in international interest rates.12 Once 
it gets started it is an endogenous process, in the 
ﬁ  nal phase capital outﬂ  ow responding more to the 
circumstances of the developing country economy 
than to international phenomena.13 
12  Although, for instance, the increases in interest rates in the United States at the end of 1970s and beginning of 1980s and, again, in early 1994, had a lot to do 
with the following crises, the ﬁ  rst one, almost only in Latin America and the second, ﬁ  rst in Mexico and then extended to a whole series in Asia, Russia and 
Latin America.
13  See, for instance, “When it rains it pours: Procyclical capital ﬂ  ows and macroeconomic policies” by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, NBER Working Paper 
No. 10780, September 2004. Their conclusions are: 1. that net capital inﬂ  ows are pro-cyclical (vis-a-vis the borrowing countries including OECD countries and 
not only for EMEs), 2. that ﬁ  scal and monetary policies in developing countries are also pro-cyclical and 3. that periods of large capital inﬂ  ows are associated 
with expansionary macroeconomic policies and the contrary happens in periods of capital outﬂ  ows. 
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Several mechanisms could explain the pernicious 
effects of instability on growth. One key channel 
could be the negative effect on “animal spirits” 
discouraging ﬁ  rms to expand their investment in 
more output capacity. Instability also could lead to 
restrictions on access to long-term ﬁ  nance necessary 
for development projects. On the whole, in the words 
of Kose and Prasad, ﬁ  nancial integration “seems to 
strengthen the negative relationship between growth 
and volatility”.14 
2|3  Financial inﬂ  ows and growth 
in developing countries
More in general, however, the relationship between 
ﬁ  nancial opening up or between capital inﬂ  ows and 
growth, beyond indirect effects via instability has 
seriously been put into question. From doubts about 
a positive effect to the conclusion that there might 
be a negative effect of capital inﬂ  ows for growth, the 
literature has made signiﬁ  cant progress in the years 
previous to the present-day crisis. 
Already, back in the 1990’s Jadish Bhagwati had 
insisted in the fact there were no theoretical grounds 
–equivalent to those that applied to international 
trade– to support the view that ﬁ  nancial opening-up 
was good for growth.15 But then Rogoff et al. at the 
Research Department of the IMF and again, in a ﬁ  rst 
version, Raghuram Rajan, from the same position, 
were some of the authors of a stream of papers 
showing that capital inﬂ  ows could not necessarily 
be good for growth, in fact, in the case of Rajan 
and his co-authors, actually deleterous to growth. 
Additionally, Professor Aizenman at the University 
of California would show that self-ﬁ  nancing was 
associated with high rates of growth. In the two last 
cases, and in that of other less well-known authors, 
running a current account surplus –paradoxically 
for traditional thinking on the subject– was shown 
to be good for growth.16 
The experience of the series of crises involving almost 
all latitudes of the world and the conclusions of the 
above mentioned studies, led to the conviction, for 
more than one government and sector of public opinion 
that ﬁ  nancial liberalisation was a force for instability 
and not for growth.17 Consequently, developing 
countries rather than running current account deﬁ  cits 
and ﬁ  nancing them with inﬂ  ows of capital –as had 
been the case over the previous almost two decades of 
ﬁ  nancial globalisation– had to the contrary been trying 
–not always successfully– to avoid running deﬁ  cits. 
It was found rather preferable to run surpluses and 
to keep capital inﬂ  ows at bay, particularly those not 
associated with foreign direct investment. To put it into 
a nutshell, many countries opted for an “export-led” 
strategy instead of a “debt-led” one. 
14  See Box 2.3. “Why is volatility harmful?” in “Output volatility in emerging market and developing countries” a section of Chap. II “Two current issues facing 
developing countries” of International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, April 2005. The preoccupation with negative effects of instability is rather recent 
in conventional literature and it runs against conclusions of Lucas: “Models of business cycles”, 1987 welfare costs of ﬂ  uctuations being minor in his opinion. 
See also Kose, Prasad and Terrones “Growth and volatility in an era of globalisation”, IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 52, Special Issue, 2005. In their view trade and 
ﬁ  nancial integration could have signiﬁ  cant effects on the instability of the developing economies. 
15  See his “The capital myth: the difference between trade in widgets and dollars” by Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1998. Bhagwati, paraphrasing 
the farewell speech of Gral. Eisenhower as President of the United States, concocted the expression the “Wall Street-Treasury Complex” to depict what he thought 
was the way the IMF was governed.
16  See “Effects of ﬁ  nancial globalisation on developing countries: some empirical evidence” by Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei and M. Ayhan Kose, 
IMF, March 17, 2003. This report was discussed at the Fund in an IMF Economic Forum at which three of the authors were present (Prasad, Rogoff and Wei) plus 
C. Fred Bergsten –from the Washington Institute of International Economics– Jeffrey Frankel –from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University– 
and Prof. Daniel Tarullo, from the Georgetown University Law Center (presently Member of the Board of the Federal Reserve System); see the transcript in 
“Is ﬁ  nancial globalisation harmful for developing countries?” Washington, D.C., May 27, 2003. If anything the discussants reinforced the report’s conclusions. 
Bergsten made the point that a confusion between domestic ﬁ  nancial liberalisation and ﬁ  nancial account openness had become too habitual, with the former 
bringing in unmitigated beneﬁ  ts while the latter not having shown to be particularly positive. Frankel also came in favouring some kind of restrictions on capital 
movements à la Chile. From the same IMF Research Department see “The elusive gains from international ﬁ  nancial integration”, prepared by Gourinchas 
and Jeanne, IMF Working Paper, WP 04/74, May 2004. In their estimate the gains between total ﬁ  nancial autarchy and perfect capital mobility could be of 
the order of a permanent 1 per cent increase in consumption. For Prof. Aizenman contribution see Aizenman: “Financial liberalisations in Latin America in 
the 1990s: an assessment”, Economic Journal, 2005, pp. 959-983, where a positive relation is established between self-ﬁ  nancing and growth and also for his 
previous paper where the methodology of the self-ﬁ  nancing coefﬁ  cient is developed, see a paper prepared for the World Bank, Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill 
“Sources for ﬁ  nancing domestic capital- is foreign saving a viable option for developing countries?”, April 2005. For Rajan and his colleagues, see Prasad, Rajan 
and Subramanian: “Foreign capital and economic growth” in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Nov.2007. Moreover, Prof. Stiglitz had commented on 
the Rogoff et al. paper in his “Capital market liberalisation, globalisation and the IMF”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 20, No. 11 (2004), questioning 
how come it had been a surprise for the authors to ﬁ  nd out that liberalisation of capital inﬂ  ows was not a necessary neither a sufﬁ  cient condition for growth. 
17  In fact, due to the Asian crisis, the IMF stopped to discuss a change in its Articles of Agreement that would have made compulsory to liberalise capital ﬂ  ows for 
all member countries, in an equal footing to current account transactions. 
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2|4  The US deﬁ  cit and the “exorbitant 
privilege” as a reserve currency issuer
Resort to private international ﬁ  nancial markets to 
ﬁ  nance current account deﬁ  cits, therefore, became less 
attractive. But there was one exception and not precisely 
that of a developing country, e.g., the United States. In 
this case, deﬁ  cits could be ﬁ  nanced by issuing what 
remained, even after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system, as the single, by far, most important “reserve 
currency” in the world economy.
In fact, for the world at large, as may be gathered from the 
following graph, the proportion of the US dollar in foreign 
exchange reserves lies between 60 and 65 per cent. For 
advanced countries this proportion even increased during 
the ﬁ  rst phase of the present-day crisis, from the last 
quarter of 2007 to the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009. 
Consequently, for the United States –the crisis unleashed– 
there was none of the habitual run against the currency as 
in the case of other countries or even under its own early 
1970’s troubles. On the contrary over several quarters 
there was a “run towards” the US dollar, the so-called 
“ﬂ  ight-to-quality”, in spite of serious difﬁ  culties in the 
ﬁ  nancial sector as well as the presence, even if reduced, 
of the well-known external deﬁ  cit. The US government 
and their monetary authorities, therefore, could enjoy 
the privilege of fighting the crisis with substantial 
monetary expansion and a signiﬁ  cant increase in ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cits, something that the rest of the countries running 
deﬁ  cits could never have imagined. Moreover, the latter 
would never have been allowed by the IMF to take such 
measures under Fund-supported programmes or access 
to their “facilities”. 
The episode just conﬁ  rms one more side of the “exorbitant 
privilege” that has allowed the United States to run year 
after year –even under crisis conditions– considerable 
external deﬁ  cits. Such a condition accounts to a signiﬁ  cant 
degree for the persistence and increasing magnitude of 
the “global imbalances” problem. As long as the currency 
of a single country remains being the “dominant” reserve 
currency, for the world at large, external deﬁ  cits both 
become unavoidable and at the same time a potential 
fulcrum for crises dominated by current account reversals 
(the famous Trifﬁ  n paradox), if the “ﬂ  ight-to-quality” 
process at some point reaches exhaustion. 
If one would try to extrapolate some trends, a look at 
what is happening with the composition of the foreign 
exchange reserves of the fast growing developing 
countries, would point towards that potentiality possibly 
becoming actual. In fact, the proportion of US dollars 
in their foreign exchange reserves has been following a 
deep downward trend. Additionally, in their case there 
was little of the “reverse run” vis-a-vis the USD during 
the crisis as it was the case with advanced economies. 
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To summarise, ﬁ  nancial globalisation, the other 
side of the coin of deﬁ  cits in current account, 
providing an apparently easy way to balance them, 
had proved to be a force for instability and against 
growth for developing countries. On the contrary, 
experience has shown that running surpluses in 
current account is a force for growth. In the following 
we will be showing the way in which such a process 
has asserted itself. 
3| DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
SURPLUSES IN CURRENT ACCOUNT AS 
AN INSTRUMENT OF GROWTH STRATEGY
AND THE POLICIES TO SUSTAIN THEM
3|1  The shift in current accounts, 
the reduction in indebtedness 
and the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves
In the following graph, the shift in the current 
accounts of the developing countries comes out 
very clearly. However, it is less than a generalised 
circumstance as, for instance, among those countries, 
there are several major ones as Brazil and India, that 
keep running a deﬁ  cit. 
Surpluses, as may be gathered by the following 
two graphs, have resulted in a signiﬁ  cant decline in 
external debt levels, which in our country is called 
a “disindebtedness” strategy. As to external debt 
levels, for developing countries in the aggregate, the 
highest points were reached, respectively, in 1998 
and 1999 (165% of exports in 1998 and 41% of GDP 
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As to debt service, the highest points were reached, 
respectively, in 1999 and 2002 (40% of exports in 1999 
and 25% of GDP in 2002) while nowadays those 
ﬁ  gures stand at 26 and 8 per cent.18 
The shift into surpluses by developing countries, also, 
has resulted in considerable accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. Between 1995 and 2009 foreign 
exchange reserves of developing countries expanded 
from USD 458 billion to USD 5.394 billion and from a 
third to two thirds of world foreign exchange reserves. 
As argued by Rodrik, the foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation is not due to trade opening as the 
advanced countries, very much involved in trade 
liberalisation, have kept holding an equivalent of 
2 to 4 months of imports, with some increase in 
the last two years. While in the case of developing 
countries, reserves are now equivalent to about 
14 months of imports up from the same level as that 
of the advanced countries 30 years before as may be 
gathered from the following graph.19 
In the case of developing countries, accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves could be a policy 
target pursued on its own for pure prudential 
purposes. In a world of high volatility of capital 
ﬂ  ows and moreover of foreign exchange receipts 
arising out of trade balances under the inﬂ  uence of 
signiﬁ  cant shifts in prices and sometimes even in 
quantities depending on the vagaries of the weather, 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves could be a 
reasonable policy of preparation for a “rainy day”. 
18  Comparisons with a majority of the advanced countries would take us too far away from the main line of argument. 
19  See Rodrik, (2006): “The social cost of foreign exchange reserves”, January, NBERw11952. 
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Moreover, as most countries have found IMF recipes 
for adjustment far away from what in their view 
–and that of a signiﬁ  cant section of academic opinion– 
was adequate to sort out their problems under crises, 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves becomes 
a way to self-insure against unexpected shocks.20 
As long as ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows to developing countries 
continue to be ridden by instability and that resort to 
the IMF is to be avoided on grounds of quantitative 
restrictions and misplaced “conditionality”, 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is a 
powerful instrument of self-insurance as it was 
proved under the present-day crisis. 
3|2  The exchange rate policy
The export-led strategy endlessly recommended as 
the one to be followed by developing countries has 
added an additional element to the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves. Many developing 
countries having opted for such a strategy of entering 
into foreign markets with not only primary produce 
but also with recently acquired capacities to produce 
ever more sophisticated manufacturing goods, 
realised –something already well-known 50 years 
before– that their exchange rates should not become 
overvalued. Overvaluation could be a consequence 
of the well-known “Dutch disease” for countries that 
traditionally had been primary products exporters 
but additionally the result of being on the receiving 
end of the “carry-trade” during the “push” phase of 
capital ﬂ  ows from advanced countries. 
In cyclical terms, as already mentioned, once a phase 
of overvaluation has begun soon the country runs 
external deﬁ  cits and foreign obligations accumulate. 
The end of the process has always been a crisis either 
because of a shift in ﬁ  nancial markets in advanced 
countries or by the sheer accumulation of external 
obligations. 
Consequently an active policy to combat overvaluation 
of the exchange rate has become more widespread, 
combined, in a few cases, with the introduction of 
some form of controls against short-term capital 
inﬂ  ows. 
No doubt, exchange rate policy remains an area 
of controversy and shifting opinions set against a 
background of changes in the actual regimes put 
into practice by the different countries and again 
in a world context that has experienced signiﬁ  cant 
transformations. On the whole, de jure, but more 
importantly de facto most countries have gone 
over from the ﬁ  xed exchange rate system under 
Bretton Woods to some form of “managed ﬂ  oating”, 
the so-called “middle” regimes. 
The problem with exchange rates and most 
speciﬁ  cally in the case of developing countries, is that 
they are simultaneously the most important price for 
ﬁ  nancial markets and for foreign trade at the same 
time (and the domestic price level). The workings of 
ﬁ  nancial markets make for it to be the most unstable 
price while the consequences of such instability in 
terms of price signals for the “real” economy are far 
from positive even if hedging for short-run purposes 
could be eventually developed.21 
Moreover, the conclusion was drawn that due to 
such instability, if capital movements are free, there 
is no real monetary policy autonomy under ﬂ  exible 
exchange rates, a situation having been baptised 
20  See Aizenman: “International reserves” The Palgrave Dictionary, new edition (2005) and also Aizenman and Lee: “International reserves: precautionary versus 
mercantilist views, theory and evidence”, mimeo (August 2005). For earlier contributions see Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb: “Optimal international reserves and sovereign 
risk”, Journal of International Economics, 33 (1992). An even earlier attempt at estimating optimal level of reserves was that of Heller: “Optimal international 
reserves”, Economic Journal, 76 (1966). 
21  In the words of Cooper, in his “Exchange rate choices” (June 1999): “…movements in exchange rates, while providing a useful shock absorber for real disturbances to 
the world economy, are also a substantial source of uncertainty for trade and capital formation, the wellsprings of economic progress” (underlined in the original). 
Cooper, in this same piece, also strongly criticises Harry G. Johnson strenuous advocacy of ﬂ  oating exchange rates a few decades ago: “He (Harry G. Johnson) 
demonstrates a charming faith in the ability of private markets to get the exchange rate right, and to keep it there” and goes on to criticise his various assertions on 
which the case for ﬂ  oating rates were based, e.g., that the foreign exchange market was as any other one small relative to the size of the economy, that it was a stable 
market, that the exchange rate movements would be dominated by inﬂ  ation differentials and that the market would develop the necessary hedging instruments. 
Work by Obstfeld, jointly with Rogoff, has shown that the cost of ﬂ  oating could be of the order of 1% of GDP under fairly restrictive conditions for risk aversion; 
see Obstfeld and Rogoff: “Risk and exchange rates”, NBER Working Paper No. 6694 (August 1998) and also Aghion, Bacchetta, Rancière and Rogoff, developed a 
model and tested it over an 83 country data set spanning the years 1960-2000 showing that but for countries in a very advanced level of ﬁ  nancial development –as 
measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP– exchange rate volatility reduces growth; see Aghion, Bacchetta, Rancière and Rogoff: “Exchange rate volatility and 
productivity growth: the role of ﬁ  nancial development”, NBER Working Paper No. 12117 (March 2006). 
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as the “impossible duality” rather than Mundell’s 
impossible trinity.22 
Making room for an autonomous policy therefore, 
implies introducing controls on at least short-term 
capital movements –an issue that will be addressed 
later– and avoiding floating exchange rates. 
But then what would be the appropriate exchange 
rate regime for a developing country intended 
on enhancing growth but not relying on “foreign 
savings”, or if at all in a most cautious way?
The exchange rate regime, non-ﬂ  oating so as to 
deliver a degree of autonomy for monetary policy, 
should at the same time be such that it promotes 
exports, most especially non-traditional exports 
and addtionally a small surplus on trade and real 
services balance to ensure service of a low degree of 
indebtedness and FDI. An answer, for instance, has 
been offered by John Williamson, i.e. the crucial 
element for developing such a “real” external 
positive balance is that of maintaining a competitive 
real effective exchange rate (REER) level, in his 
words a “development strategy approach” to an 
exchange rate regime.23 
Further contributions to the debate on the right 
exchange rate policy for developing countries have 
later been made. Professor Dani Rodrik has quite 
convincingly argued that an undervalued exchange 
rate leads to much faster growth by examining a large 
sample of developing countries over the 1950–2004 
period. Professor Rodrik argument revolves around 
breaking down externalities that do not allow 
for faster growth in the traded-goods, especially in 
the non-traditional sector; overvaluation, instead, 
dampening growth.24 And in a recent IMF working paper 
by Andrew Berg and Yanliang Mao, using a different 
deﬁ  nition of deviation from “equilibrium” exchange 
rates, on the whole, the same conclusion is reached.25 
Of course, one could easily point out that a “fallacy of 
composition” is involved if all countries in the world aim 
at exchange rate targets, i.e., there are only n-1 degrees 
of freedom to set the exchange rates of the n countries 
in the world. The above reasoning boils down to the 
fact that in a very basic sense there is an interphase 
between the international trade and ﬁ  nancial systems. 
Developing countries would need the more advanced 
countries to accept adopting exchange rates so that 
their “real external surpluses” could be accommodated. 
This, in turn, means accepting an aggregate import 
surplus, something that, bearing in mind the either 
surplus or low negative Net international investment 
position of the advanced economies, would be far from 
impossible in balance of payments terms. Otherwise 
the present-day dynamic role of developing countries 
could be coming to a halt. 
3|3  The introduction of capital controls
After the examination of the effects of ﬁ  nancial 
liberalisation, an obvious conclusion comes to one’s 
mind, i.e., a ﬁ  rst way to gain autonomy –“policy 
space”– from the instability of world ﬁ  nancial markets 
–and its negative effects on both instability and growth 
22 See  Cooper,  op.cit. “…free movements of capital and ﬂ  oating exchange rates are basically incompatible…of course, free movements of capital are also incompatible 
with ﬁ  xed but adjustable exchange rates…they (countries) may reasonably choose to preserve the right to control at least certain kinds of capital movements 
into and out of their jurisdictions, in the interests of reducing both nominal and real exchange variability” quoting himself in the “Should capital controls be 
banished?”, op.cit. The “impossible duality” expression is coined in Flassbeck: “The exchange rate: economic policy tool or market price?”, UNCTAD Discussion 
Papers No. 157, Geneva (November 2001). 
  For a predecessor advocating the need for exchange controls to gain monetary policy autonomy one could look back to the 1930s and the opinions of the 
First Secretary General of UNCTAD, Raul Prebisch, at that time General Manager of the newly created Central Bank of Argentina. Prebisch –who always had 
thought of himself as an orthodox economist– ended up defending the exchange control system that had been instituted in September 1931. In his view, exchange 
controls were absolutely necessary in order to be able to introduce a “national monetary policy” that would gain some autonomy for the country from world 
forces beyond her control, echoes, maybe, of the “managed money” advocacy by Keynes. Exchange controls were considered by him as a mechanism only for 
the ﬁ  nancial sphere and not –at least in his writings– as an element of protectionism for the country’s produce. For that, Argentina –he said– must have her 
own customs policy; otherwise it would be imposed by the great powers. See O’Connell: “The return of vulnerability and Raul Prebisch’s early thinking on the 
‘Argentine Business Cycle’”, ECLA Review No. 75 (December 2001).
23  See Williamson: “Exchange rate policy and development”, Initiative for policy dialogue, Barcelona, June 2, 2003. The author, however, assigns the paternity of 
the idea to Bela Balassa and mentions that Max Corden somewhat derogatorily had labelled this approach as “exchange rate protection”. 
24  See Rodrik: “The real exchange rate and economic growth”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2008), 2, pp.365-412. In Prof. Rodrik contribution the 
undervaluation is relative to a PPP level after adjusting for per capita income to take into account the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
25  See Berg and Mao: “The real exchange rate and growth revisited: the Washington consensus strikes back?”, IMF Working Paper, WP/10/58, March 2010. 
Berg and Mao use a deﬁ  nition of “Fundamental equilibrium exchange rate”(FEER) bringing in terms of trade, government consumption (as a share of GDP), 
investment (also as a share of GDP) and openness and, therefore, under-or-overvaluations are referred to that rate.
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of developing countries– is to introduce some system 
of administration of capital flows. Additionally, 
according to the well-known Mundell trilemma, the 
adoption of some form of capital controls allows a 
country to have an exchange rate policy without 
having to relinquish autonomy over monetary 
policy.26 Curiously enough, such a device even if 
not extremely popular in policy circles is within the 
formal “rules of the game”. As a matter of fact, the 
articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund do allow for the introduction of capital controls.27 
In a contribution surveying about 30 empirical 
studies of the effects of capital controls, four reasons 
are offered for their introduction. First, avoiding 
exchange rate appreciation that would reduce 
competitiveness. Second, avoiding an accumulation 
of “hot money” ready to leave the country at the ﬁ  rst 
perceived sign of difﬁ  culties. Third, avoiding too 
large inﬂ  ows that might generate asset price bubbles 
and overconsumption as well as dislocations in the 
ﬁ  nancial system and, fourth, avoiding the loss of 
monetary autonomy.28 
Several types of capital controls have been applied 
or suggested. Within policy-circles as well as the 
academic ones little sympathy has been shown for 
administrative-type of capital controls that in many 
advanced countries were only dismantled in the last 
two decades. There is also an overwhelming opinion 
that capital controls are better applied to inﬂ  ows 
rather than to outﬂ  ows and, in the extreme case 
when the latter are applied, they should basically 
be temporary. There is however no unanimity on 
these matters.29 
The better known and most widely accepted 
form of capital controls was the application of 
an “uncompensated reserve requirement” (URR) 
to some or all capital inﬂ  ows, i.e., to sterilise a 
signiﬁ  cant proportion of the inﬂ  ow in a non-interest 
bearing deposit, making it less proﬁ  table to play 
with short-term capital movements. Such an 
instrument was applied by Chile in the 1990s 
and by Argentina in this last decade beginning 
in 2005. Capital inﬂ  ow surges –and the ensuing 
accumulation of fragilities could thus be tempered– 
and “policy space” for ﬁ  scal and monetary policy 
would be earned. Minimum stay requirements 
could also be imposed or as in Colombia, inﬂ  ows 
to invest in real-estate and portfolio investment 
could be prohibited to reduce volatility of capital 
ﬂ  ows and asset price bubbles. 
Another measure to dampen down capital inﬂ  ows 
would be to tax them; and, in fact, such an 
instrument was alternatively applied in the case 
of Chile and, again, presently by Brazil.30 Or a tax 
on capital outﬂ  ows, enough to make short-term 
speculation unproﬁ  table could also be introduced. 
The conclusion from the already mentioned paper 
by Magud and Reinhart is that controls on capital 
inflows have succeeded in making monetary 
policy more independent, reduce the pressure on 
exchange rates and alter the composition of capital 
ﬂ  ows towards the longer-term variety. Their total 
volume, however, seems to have gone unaffected. 
On the other hand, there is a widespread consensus 
that controls end up being circumvented but, 
26  As more than one author –most prominently John Williamson– has underlined the trilemma strictures have been over-dramatised by conveying the wrong idea 
that only “corner” solutions to it are possible, i.e., that there are no possible combinations of some degree of autonomy over the three elements. 
27  Art.VI (Capital Transfers) Section 3 (Controls of Capital Transfers) states “Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital 
movements...”. The crisis in Asia stopped short a very active attempt to actually reform these provisions and make it compulsory for Fund members to liberalise 
capital movements in parallel to the very basic obligation not to restrain current account transactions vested in Article VIII (General Obligations of Members), 
Section 2 (Avoidance of restrictions on current payments). In fact, the same article VI, Section 1 a) of the IMF Articles of Agreement states that “A member may 
not use the Fund’s general resources to meet a large or sustained outﬂ  ow of capital…” a prescription that has been somewhat overlooked under the 21st century 
crises –in Mr. Camdessus words– hitting the ﬁ  nancial account of Mexico, ﬁ  rst, and various other countries thereafter. It was precisely the modiﬁ  cation of this 
article that the IMF was discussing when the Asian crisis exploded. 
28  See Magud and Reinhart: “Capital controls: An evaluation”, NBER Working Paper 11973, January 2006; the authors rather than using the word “avoidance” use 
the term “fear”, maybe in the tradition of Carmen Reinhart jointly with Guillermo Calvo of the “fear of ﬂ  oating” vision; see Calvo and Reinhart: “Fear of Floating”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. CXVII, Issue 2, May 2002. 
29  See, for instance, Epstein, Grabel and Jomo: “Capital management techniques in developing countries”, January 2004. These authors dismiss four habitual criticisms 
against capital controls on the basis of what has been the experience of Chile, Colombia, Malaysia and Singapore. In their opinion, there is no justiﬁ  cation to 
believe that i) capital controls only work in the “short-run” (not the case of Singapore), ii) that they have to keep being ever more restrictive (not the case of Chile, 
for instance), iii) that they only work as to inﬂ  ows but not as to outﬂ  ows (the case of Malaysia –to which I would add that of Korea that had severe controls 
on outﬂ  ows without making them as explicit as in the ﬁ  rst case– shows that controls on outﬂ  ows could be quite effective to gain “policy space” under the crisis 
of 1997-1998) or iv) that microeconomic costs –most speciﬁ  cally on small ﬁ  rms– could be signiﬁ  cant to the point of negating their advantages. 
30  A proposal, also, has been ﬂ  oated to introduce a tax on all receipts of foreign exchange and return it to exporters via the VAT rebate system and to those earning 
income from abroad through the income tax system. This tax would be levied by ﬁ  nancial institutions on all and any receipt of foreign exchange on a withholding 
basis. See Zee: “Retarding short-term capital inﬂ  ows through a withholding tax”, IMF WP/00/40, March 2000.
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as Richard Cooper has argued, the presence of 
signiﬁ  cant margins are witness to some of their 
effectiveness.31 As Stiglitz has put it, a dam might 
have leakages but it would still avoid massive 
ﬂ  ooding of the valley below. 
4| DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS THE 
“LOCOMOTIVE” OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY VIS-A-VIS THE ROLE OF SOME 
OF THE ADVANCED SURPLUS COUNTRIES
With the aim of preserving themselves of the 
vagaries of the international ﬁ  nancial markets or as 
a consequence of avoiding the overvaluation of their 
currencies, developing countries in the aggregate 
–but as mentioned before not all of them– have 
become countries generating a surplus on current 
account. But, as it is illustrated in the following graph, 
besides some of the developing countries and regions 
having had a surplus on current account, Germany 
and Japan, also show sizable surpluses. In fact, their 
surpluses have kept growing in the last years, while 
there has been a decline in those of China and of the 
oil exporting developing countries.32
The difference, however, between the developing 
countries and the major advanced countries in 
surplus is that developing countries are growing 
fast having become the fundamental dynamic force 
in the world economy while those other countries 
in surplus are trailing behind. 
The contrast is clear. Over the period between 
1998 and 2009, while developing economies grew 
by 175 per cent, Germany and Japan, the main 
advanced surplus countries, only increased their 
real GDP by, respectively, 10.7 and 7.2 per cent. 
Moreover, as shown in the following graph in only 
a 10-year period developing economies went from 
generating 20 per cent of the increase in world GDP 
to generate almost 70 per cent of it. In fact, last year, 
while world GDP decreased, developing economies 
continued growing. 
Developing countries in surplus, differently from 
the major advanced countries with a positive current 
account, are, consequently, playing the role of 
“locomotive” of the world economy, by following 
policies to achieve fast rates of growth. 
31  See Cooper: “Should capital controls be banished?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, Washington, D.C., 1999. 
32  For China its surplus in current account that was almost USD 372 billion in 2007 fell to USD 297 billion in 2009 and will additionally drop to an estimated 
USD 270 billions in 2010. For Germany and Japan, on the other hand, even if their joint surplus also decreased from USD 464.7 billion in 2007 to USD 305 billion 
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On the contrary, those advanced surplus countries 
growing at a languishing pace are reproducing 
the well-known deﬂ  ationary bias characteristic of 
the international system. Differently from deﬁ  cit 
countries, they are able to unfettered continue 
to design their own policies; unfortunately, as 
revealed by their growth rates, restrictive policies 
playing beggar-thy-neighbour role on the rest 
of the world, the only limit being the capacity 
of the other countries to finance their deficits 
and sustain debt accumulation. Deﬁ  cit countries 
–among them quite a few developing countries but 
also lately European countries– continue, instead, 
to either live under the limits imposed by their 
amount of foreign exchange reserves or of (the 
wrong) conditionality-ridden IMF –or of the newly 
established EU/eurozone– resources forcing them 
into a deﬂ  ationary path. 
Redressing or at least moderating global imbalances in the coming years would require action at 
international and domestic levels. But no solution should be at the expense of growth, full employment 
and social justice. 
In the international sphere, a major issue would be that of regulating cross-border capital ﬂ  ows other than 
foreign direct investment ones so as to curb their volatility, an issue that has almost not been tackled at 
all in the last years’ discussions about ﬁ  nancial regulation. 
A second issue, would be to work on the reform of the international monetary system so as to provide 
a means of payment and a reserve currency other than that of a nation or group of nations, thus eliminating 
not only an “exorbitant privilege” but also a driving force for explosive global imbalances. 
A third issue, would be that of designing a system to clear temporary imbalances between surplus 
and deﬁ  cit countries less restrictive than the conditionality-ridden International Monetary Fund, with 
symmetrical obligations for surplus and deﬁ  cit countries but due attention to differences in growth rates 
and stage of development. 
Fourth, a cooperative arrangement should be struck among the major advanced and developing countries 
so that the advanced ones should avoid “beggar-thy-neighbour” policies that impart a deﬂ  ationary bias 
to the world economy. On the contrary, room would have to be made for the surpluses generated by the 
export-led strategies of developing countries that have become the “locomotive” of the world economy. 
Otherwise an endless recessionary phase might be entered. 
As long as little or no progress is made in those directions, developing countries should keep trying to 
generate growth by avoiding overvaluation of their currencies, protecting themselves from the vagaries 
of international ﬁ  nancial markets by introducing ﬁ  nancial account controls and self-insuring themselves 
by accumulating foreign exchange reserves and ﬁ  ghting social inequalities as well as assuring minimal 
and increasing living standards for all of their citizens attending to their basic needs.
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